Internet Restored, But the Evils of Han Chauvinism, Party-State Despotism and Bankrupt Communism Remain

Rebiya KadeerPresident, World Uyghur Congress
Posted: May 19, 2010 01:29 PM

Internet Restored, But the Evils of Han Chauvinism, Party-State Despotism and Bankrupt Communism Remain

On May 14, residents of East Turkestan rediscovered the Internet -- not the Internet of unfettered access that is enjoyed the world over, but a lifting of the most draconian Internet restrictions ever seen so that people could finally access China's censored version. For 10 months, starting from the July 2009 unrest in Urumchi, the Chinese government kept the people of East Turkestan isolated from the rest of the world with a comprehensive communications lockdown that not only blocked the Internet, but also affected telecommunications. During those 10 months, a great deal of information about the events of July 2009 were never allowed to surface and the world was left with a Chinese government account that in no way can be considered impartial.

The communications lockdown was an illustration of the chilling ideology of power that guides the decisions of power brokers in the Chinese Communist Party. In those 10 months, the Chinese government conducted a brutal crackdown on Uyghurs largely unseen by the outside world. The "stable conditions" required to restore the Internet were established through indiscriminate detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, sham trials and swift executions of Uyghurs. Human Rights Watch described the 43 enforced disappearances it recorded in a report, We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them, as the tip of the iceberg. In addition, the reports that managed to leak out of torture and death in custody of Uyghurs, such as that of Shohret Tursun, only hint at the depth of repression that happened during those 10 months.

Now the Chinese government is attempting to show a benevolent face with announcements of large-scale investment, comprehensive work forums, the removal of reviled officials, such as Wang Lequan, and most recently the restoration of the Internet. This benevolence must be taken with a degree of skepticism not only because the decisions are not being made for the welfare of the Uyghur people, but also because they show a lack of original thinking among Chinese officials.

Since 2000, large injections of capital into East Turkestan through the central government's Western Development initiative merely exaggerated the economic inequality between Uyghurs and Han Chinese rather than benefit impoverished Uyghurs. Future investment, as far as it can be gleaned, will come once more in the form of more money for mineral extraction that does not aim to employ the local Uyghur workforce or engage Uyghur businesses.

The appointment of Zhang Chunxian as Party Secretary has been interpreted as a break from the hard-line policies of former Party chief, Wang Lequan; however, in recent comments it appears that Zhang will bring nothing to the table but the same tired rhetoric on smashing the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism. What true introspection on the performance of the Chinese Communist Party in East Turkestan reveals is that the real three evils in the region are Han chauvinism, party-state despotism and bankrupt communism.

Old ideas of the Chinese communists towards East Turkestan have merely been repackaged and recycled and do not address the economic and political tensions that underpinned the unrest in Urumchi. There is much work to do and many grievances to address. I am willing to help the Chinese government resolve them.

A genuine new approach to resolving the numerous economic, social and political issues in East Turkestan involves meaningful dialogue and consultation with the Uyghur people. This means all Uyghurs- in exile and in East Turkestan, and conducted in an open atmosphere of equality without the fear of imprisonment for merely expressing a view. I doubt if the upcoming work form will be held under such conditions.

I believe the Chinese government should end its aggressive policy of monolingual education, and give students and their parents a choice about their language of instruction. Chinese government policies ensuring equal employment opportunities for Uyghurs should be put in place, in which employment inside of East Turkestan is available to Uyghurs, instead of just sending them outside of East Turkestan to work. All Uyghurs should be allowed to attend the mosque without fear of suspicion and imams should be allowed to speak freely. The Chinese government should stop imprisoning peaceful dissenters and make them partners in a robust dialogue on the development of the region. Uyghurs will welcome these policies, and they will help to reduce tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.

If the Chinese government wants to make an immediate impact and demonstrate a sincere change in approach to build trust among the Uyghur people, it could do no better than to release all those Uyghur bloggers and web administrators it detained in the wake of the unrest. This includes Memet Turghun Abdulla, a photographer who published an article online about an attack on Uyghur factory workers believed to have sparked the July 2009 unrest; Gheyret Niyaz, a journalist who was detained after talking to foreign media about the unrest; Dilshat Parhat, who co-founded the Uyghur-run website Diyarim; Obulkasim, an employee of Diyarim; Nureli, who founded the Uyghur website Selkin; and website supervisor Muhemmet. All of these individuals have disappeared into the murky depths of the Chinese criminal justice system. No one knows where they are being held or of their current condition.

The Internet is admired as a tool for freedom of speech and citizen participation the world over -- in China, and particularly in East Turkestan, it is used to root out critics of government policies. Uyghur participation and freedom of speech are fundamental overarching conditions in achieving a resolution to the East Turkestan issue. Without it the cycle of old policies of repression repackaged as new policies of repression will continue unabated.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebiya-kadeer/internet-restored-but-the_b_581992.html

U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: America Must Lead by Example

U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: America Must Lead by Example
Published on May 24, 2010 by Derek Scissors, Ph.D.
On May 24, the United States and People’s Republic of China will start the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing. In the economic track, the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicates that the American side will focus primarily on three areas, probably in this order of priority:
President Obama’s goal of doubling U.S. exports and the role of the RMB’s value against the dollar;
Policies that harm foreign business in China, now described as “indigenous innovation”; and
Greater balance in the bilateral economic relationship and the global economy.
The S&ED will make little progress on these issues and less still to bring China into the international economic order. Instead, the U.S. is heading in China’s policy direction.
The S&ED’s Limitations
The S&ED serves as a useful way for America and China to exchange information, which helps avoid economic disputes before they materialize. But it has produced modest cooperation even where the two sides have shared interests, such as energy. It has not, and will not, address severe problems in the American, Chinese, or world economies.
At first glance, it appears an RMB appreciation against the dollar would support the President’s goal of doubling exports. An appreciation, though, will have little effect. The connection between the RMB and the bilateral trade imbalance is uncertain at best, and the coming shift in Chinese currency policy will again be very tentative, not enough to affect much of anything.[1]
Worse, the drive to double exports clashes with what should be the American goal for the RMB. The Obama Administration seeks to promote exports largely through government support, while the U.S. should be pressing China for less government control of its exchange rate. This is only one example of America warping its own policy due in part to its relationship with the PRC.
There are also reasons to expect that nothing material will come from discussing “indigenous innovation.” Putting aside the overly broad use of the term, indigenous innovation is part of a concerted effort by the central government to promote state enterprises. Recently discovered by the press, the effort is at least seven years old.[2] It is part of a much broader and well-established mercantilist Chinese approach to commerce. Modifications of a few recent regulations will do nothing to alter China’s course.
The U.S. continues to shy from an even more important issue: global rebalancing. Washington is right to exhort Beijing to move toward an economy led by consumption, not investment. However, discussing the issue yet further will accomplish nothing new—the State Council itself endorsed rebalancing in 2004, but the gap between investment and consumption then widened dramatically.[3] The change China must ultimately make will be painful, hardly one to be accomplished by another year of chatter.

Nonetheless, the U.S. can contribute to this change and help its own economy immensely at the same time by going forward instead of backward with American rebalancing. Rather than talking, the Obama Administration and the U.S. Congress can take the biggest single action to actually rebalance by quickly slashing the gigantic federal budget deficit.
Who’s Changing Whom?
Part of the original reason for the S&ED and other bilateral dialogues was to encourage Chinese economic and security policies to fit better with American ones. It appears, though, the U.S. is becoming more like the PRC instead of the reverse.
That the U.S. could help transform China gained credence during the first Clinton Administration. It was argued that there was political value in economic engagement: engagement and resultant prosperity would facilitate greater freedom in the PRC. The process, however, has yet to begin. Despite greater economic opportunities for most Chinese citizens, the grip of the Communist Party has not loosened. To be fair, realistic advocates of engagement acknowledged that the process would take time; 15 years may not be enough to alter the way 1.3 billion Chinese live.
Apparently, however, 15 years is enough to alter the way 300 million Americans live. The U.S. seems to be the country that is changing—following the Chinese example in extending the reach of government.
This transformation starts with ever-expanding federal spending assisted by Chinese financing. President Clinton’s engagement policy was laid out in May 1994. That year the deficit was 2.9 percent of GDP and falling toward zero; this year it will be 10.6 percent of GDP. In the interim, Chinese holdings of American bonds soared from barely $100 billion in March 2000 to more than $1.5 trillion now.[4]
More and more economic resources are controlled by Washington, with federal spending surpassing 25 percent of GDP, the highest since World War II. That level is projected to skyrocket due to the impending tsunami of entitlement spending.[5] Unsatisfied with a federal budget near its historical levels of 20 percent of GDP, the President and Congress continue to seek foreign money, especially from the PRC. Rather than encouraging Chinese society to change for the better, the economic interaction has given rein to the U.S. to change for the worse.
Part of the federal expansion is the demand that someone else’s money must fund another new program. This old game has a new flavor: taxpayers should fork over more so America can keep pace with China. Billions should be spent on wind turbines that generate relatively little energy, because China is doing the same. Massive high speed rail lines that few will use must be built, because China is doing so.[6]
The PRC is not making these comparisons—they are made in the U.S. by those seeking a share of the flood of government spending. And they are almost always deeply flawed.
Thankfully, many secrets of China’s success are not transportable, such as the ability to forcibly clear people from land desired by the state. There are largely unnoticed fault lines in the Chinese model, such as children of Party members making up 90 percent of the wealthiest Chinese, though Party membership is less than 5 percent of the population.[7] There is no dictatorial Party to enrich in the U.S., but the hungry acquisition of resources by the federal government is a long step in the wrong direction.
Recommendations: Start Here
The PRC is not moving toward more political freedom. Instead, many American politicians have taken engagement with China as a prod to move this country toward less economic freedom. Prior to discussions with China, America should reverse economic course.
Starting with the FY 2011 budget, the Administration and Congress should cut federal spending more decisively than implied by the targeted 3 percent of GDP by FY 2015. Even more pressing, they should wrench the major entitlements—Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—back to a sustainable course.
As a byproduct of fixing its own house, America’s relationship with China can be much more effectively addressed. By recommitting to the market, the U.S. can more credibly press the PRC on statist policies that harm American companies and the world economy.
The dialogue aspect of the S&ED should give way in part to focused negotiations on one or two economic issues (only) for each round. The exchange rate has proven a minor factor and should not be the focus. Instead, the spotlight should be on the full set of policies, not just indigenous innovation, that support Chinese state enterprises at everyone else’s expense.
Derek Scissors, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Asia Economic Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.